

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

## From the Other to the Double: Identity in Conflict and the Boston Marathon Bombing

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*Mediated representations of identity have long been mobilized to energize war efforts. While conflict has changed significantly in the past 70 years, thinking about the relationship between identity, media representation, and conflict continues to revolve around notions of the Other. This article develops a more nuanced theory of identity and conflict, as it manifests in the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism, through the figure of the Double. The function of identity in and for conflict is explored by situating media representations of threat in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing within theories of enmity and biopower. Ultimately, the article argues that the Double, which unsettles identity and defers its closure, is a fundamental component of the strategies and discourses of contemporary conflict.*

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The identity of a collective or nation is most strongly felt, and forged, in and through conflict. The relationship is symbiotic. Not only does war help to solidify a collective's sense of self, but that sense of self also plays a key role in energizing any war effort. The mediated deployment of identity to beat the drums of war is often done in the negative, that is, through the formulation of an adversary that embodies all that a collective is not. The threatening Other is made visually discernible through the media. One need only think of the portrayals of Jews in Germany or the German and Japanese caricatures common in the United States during World War II (WWII). War has since changed. Increasingly mediated and decentralized, conflict no longer primarily involves conventional forces fighting on clearly delineated battlefields. Yet, scholarly thinking about the communication and function of identity in conflict—particularly in studies of media representation—has largely remained focused on notions of the Other.

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The phenomenon of homegrown terrorism—Americans (residents or citizens) taking up arms against their own country either at home or abroad—necessitates a rethinking of these issues. In official and mediated discourse, the homegrown threat is communicated as lacking a profile, indistinguishable from the general populace through categories of race, ethnicity, class, or religious upbringing (e.g., Napolitano, 2010). I argue that the representational practices tied to this discourse cannot be adequately understood through the figure of the Other. Rather, the form and function of representations of homegrown threat are captured in the Double, a figure that blurs the boundary between us and Other, amalgamating them in shifting and ambivalent ways. In the context of homegrown terrorism, how exactly are citizens marked as threatening in the media? What can the Double tell us about how identity functions in and through conflict? Does the function of the Double differ greatly from that of the Other? How do the Double and the Other intersect and overlap? What is the place of the Double in the relations of enmity and power characteristic of the global war on terror?

To answer these questions, I develop a theory of the Double that links representational practices of homegrown threat to broader issues concerning the function of identity vis-à-vis enmity and power. After setting the stage by sketching out the histories of (homegrown) terrorism, the representational practices concerning terrorism, and the literary figure of the Double, the argument proceeds in two parts. First, the Double arises out of an examination of media and official discourses of homegrown terrorism; an analysis of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing serves to ground the argument. The representational practices within these discourses are shown to closely mirror the literary strategies characteristic of the Double motif, as illustrated in iconic works of the genre such as Dostoyevsky's *The Double* and Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*. Second, I outline how, in contrast to the Other, which unifies a collective, the Double functions to unsettle any such unity and defer the closure of a collective's identity. I situate the Double within Schmitt's theory of enmity and Foucault's notion of biopower to highlight how its function (within in the parameters of collective identity) is a fundamental component of waging war in an era marked by limitless conflict. I conclude by considering the consequences of the Double for notions of belonging, the continued importance of the Other and its relation to the Double, and the avenues of research suggested by the theory developed here.

### Homegrown terrorism and the Double

The term "terrorism" has long been used to vilify adversaries; however, in the early 1970s, scholars and government officials began to meet at conferences in order to examine various actors, actions, and utterances as terroristic. Experts and academic journals devoted to the phenomenon emerged, effectively transforming terrorism into an object of study (Stamplintzky, 2013). The legal landscape also changed. The FBI began tracking terrorism in the United States in the mid-1980s. Terrorism was

entrenched in the U.S. legal code in 1987; a distinction between international and domestic varieties followed in 1992. In this light, the war on terror has its origins not in 9/11, but in the long development of terrorism as a paradigm through which to make sense of political violence.

“Homegrown terrorism” only came into widespread use after 9/11. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines homegrown terrorism as Americans “engaged or preparing to engage in ideologically motivated terrorist activities” in the United States or abroad to further the goals of a foreign terrorist organization—even if they are acting independently of any organization (DHS, 2011). While officially considered distinct from domestic terrorism, the actual use of homegrown is much more complex, overlapping, and fluid. For example, the Oklahoma City bombing is often referred to as an incident of homegrown terror despite the fact that the event does not fit the DHS definition (i.e., no foreign influence was involved; Sherrow, 2012). Similarly, “ecoterrorists,” who were deemed America’s “no. 1 domestic threat” as recently as 2008, are also regularly called homegrown terrorists (“Eco-terrorism,” 2008). The “homegrown” label is often applied to any terrorist act planned on American soil by Americans, whether carried out at home or abroad.

In conflict scenarios, despite the existence of material threats and open (and mutual) declarations of enmity, each party’s adversary is, in essence, a construct that requires formulation. Images of one’s adversary are produced and disseminated through the media. Studies of the media’s representational practices throughout the war on terror have largely consisted of critiques concerning the deployment of stereotyped Others, particularly, the brown-Arab-Muslim-Other (Kumar, 2010; Powell, 2011; Said, 1979; Semati, 2010). Placed into binary frameworks of us/them, inside/outside, and good/evil, these stereotyped representations undermine any prospect of mutual understanding (Alexander, 2006). Certainly, the media do not always represent Others negatively or as wholly “outside” (Cottle, 2006). However, representations of homegrown threat present the problem differently, blurring the inside–good/outside–evil dichotomy. The so-called homegrown terrorist presents a more complex operation in which the *threat itself* is characterized in the media as simultaneously *inside* and *outside* (Chuang & Chin Roemer, 2013, 2014). Yet, so dominant is the us/Other paradigm that even Chuang and Chin Roemer, who recognize the complexities of representations of homegrown threat, reduce the resulting images to those of individuals who are “ultimately alien” or embody “the ultimate form of Otherness.” Nor do their studies attempt to tie representational practices to broader relations of power or enmity, claiming instead that representations of homegrown terrorists only signal “media confusion” about identity. Without dismissing the importance of Othering, the aim here is to develop a complementary and more nuanced relation of identity and conflict that, instead of relying on the resolution of ambiguity in representation, posits ambivalence as a fundamental component of the broader logics of conflict and policing/surveillance. A brief survey of the cases, on which the theory developed here is based, highlights what makes homegrown terrorism a suitable site for such a project.

In 2005, 12 “ecoterrorists” were arrested for their involvement in various arsons and other activities. In 2012, a white supremacist Army veteran, named Wade Michael Page, killed six people in a Sikh temple in Wisconsin. In 2008, five New Jersey men (the Fort Dix Five) were convicted of conspiring to kill U.S. military personnel. In November 2009, a Virginian named Nidal Malik Hasan killed 13 at the Fort Hood Army Base. Earlier that year, a group of four African American men (the Newburgh Four) were arrested for conspiring to detonate bombs outside two New York synagogues. In 2011, an American named Anwar al-Awlaki, who openly associated with al-Qaeda, was killed in a drone strike in Yemen. Finally, at the 2013 Boston Marathon, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev killed three people with improvised explosives.

In official and mediated discourse, this dizzying array of individuals represents the many faces of homegrown terror. Indeed, at the heart of the DHS definition of homegrown terrorism is a frightening mutability that blurs the line between foreign and native. The Double captures the shifting nature of homegrown terror not as an objective threat but, rather, as a modality of representation that performs particular functions in contemporary relations of enmity and power.

First used in the ancient Egyptian tale “the Brothers,” the Double is found in folklore across civilizations (Coates, 1988; Crawley, 1908). Historically, writers such as Jean Paul (who coined the term *doppelgänger*), E.T.A. Hoffmann, Dostoyevsky, Stevenson, Kafka, and others used the motif extensively, and it continues to be employed by contemporary authors across cultures (e.g., Pamuk, 1990; Roth, 1993; Saramago, 2004). The Double motif encompasses many forms of duality: reflections, shadows, twins, *doppelgängers*, souls, complementary characters, and internal personality splits. Once affirming man’s soul (and immortality), the Double came to signify that soul’s departure and, thus, man’s demise (Crawley, 1908; Guerard, 1967; Rank, 1971). By the 19th century, the Double became a predominantly psychological construct, signaling a crisis of identity, opposing tendencies within the individual, and man’s fundamental incompleteness (Freud, 1919; Rank, 1971). The appearance of the Double by duplication or splitting—leaving open the possibility of deception or trickery—puts into doubt the very idea of a unified subject.

The logic underlying the Double—duplication, splitting, doubt, and duplicity—has been connected to Saussure’s theory of the sign (Plank, 1980), Christian theology (Herdman, 1991), Hegel’s dialectic (Webber, 1996), Lacanian psychoanalysis (Ascroft, 2005), and Derrida’s work on language and representation (Plank, 1980). An “ambivalent amalgam” of us and Other (Webber, 1996) that embodies opposing tendencies and, at once, what is “familiar and agreeable and ... that which is concealed and kept out of sight” (Freud, 1919, p. 224), this study takes up the Double in a collective context, around the particular anxiety that a Double is thought to be roaming loose within the collective. The Double is here defined as a trope that blends the familiar and the unfamiliar by placing within the familiar an amorphous sense of otherness, strangeness, and potential danger.

The Double does not supersede the Other. First, the war on terror does not lack stereotyped images of Others, signaling the persistence of mediated practices of Othering. Second, it is, in fact, the influence of a foreign Other that officially distinguishes the homegrown from the domestic terrorist (DHS, 2011). The line between us and Other is here blurred without eliminating either category. What the Double captures is the ambivalent play of otherness in discourses that warn of a threat that can infiltrate, mutate, and materialize in the homeland. Put another way, the ambivalent yet “productive splitting” that, for Homi Bhabha (1994), constitutes the colonial subject as simultaneously savage and obedient servant, is turned back onto one’s own population. In the context of homegrown terrorism, the national subject is constituted as simultaneously threat and citizen, although not equally across subgroups. While the two figures are deeply imbricated, the distinction between the Other and the Double is crucial because, in the arena of global conflict, the Double exhibits significantly different forms of representation, fulfills a unique function and signals distinctive relations of enmity and power.

The theory presented here is a grounded one (Glaser & Strauss, 2006), arising from a critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2006) of the materials tied to the seven aforementioned cases of homegrown terrorism (five jihadist, one white supremacist, and one ecoterrorist). These materials include U.S. media coverage, “terrorist”-produced media, legislation, government hearings, and trial transcripts. In the interest of space, I focus on the jihadist cases and illustrate the theory in one of its most vivid manifestations: in the American news media’s coverage of the Boston Marathon bombing.

### **The brothers Tsarnaev: The Double motif in media and official discourse**

On 15 April 2013, two bombs detonated on the final stretch of the Boston Marathon. With about a quarter of the 23,000 participants yet to finish, the streets were still lined with spectators. Three people were killed and another 260 were injured, with 16 of the injured losing one or more limbs. Once Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev were identified as suspects, a manhunt ensued, culminating in a shootout that left Tamerlan dead. Afterwards, a friend urged Dzhokhar to turn himself in, texting “DON’T MAKE IT ANY WORSE” (quoted in Wines & Lovett, 2013, para. 52). Dzhokhar was found wounded, hiding in a boat in a residential backyard. At the time of writing, Dzhokhar had just been found guilty of all 30 counts with which he was charged. He faces the death penalty.

As details about the Tsarnaevs surfaced, commentators wondered how seemingly nice kids could perpetrate such violence. Blame was widely distributed: their mother, their turbulent home life, a mysterious uncle named Misha, their Chechen heritage, Tamerlan’s battered brain (a result of his boxing career), and failed attempts at realizing the American dream. What came to dominate the discourse surrounding the Tsarnaev brothers was a narrative of opposing tendencies and identity crises, themes central to the Double motif. The most common strategies utilized in communicating these themes are duplication and splitting/fragmentation (Guerard, 1967; Webber,

1996). Duplication and fragmentation often occur simultaneously: In Dostoyevsky's *The Double*, Mr. Golyadkin spots his exact copy, who possess all the traits he lacks; and in Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, a single man is split into two (good-natured Jekyll and abhorrent Hyde). The results are morbid: Golyadkin goes mad; Hyde consumes Jekyll. The trajectory of the Tsarnaevs, as communicated in media narratives, was tragically similar.

Media accounts posited that within Tamerlan and Dzhokhar, Chechen immigrants "reared by both Chechnya and America," existed opposing tendencies and a torn identity (Ioffe, 2013). At the core of the narrative was the brothers' inability to "define themselves or where they belonged" (Reitman, 2013, p. 54)—a plotline that characterizes many cases of homegrown terror, albeit in different contexts, such as the 2009 Fort Hood shooting (Szpunar, 2013). Tamerlan's outsider status was illustrated as largely self-evident. He never assimilated, had no American friends, and married a well-off white woman whom he made convert and wear the hijab (Smith & Murphy, 2013). Yet, as a boxer with Olympic aspirations, his friends called him "Tim." After a rule change regarding eligibility effectively ended his career, it was reported that he became more rigid, disgruntled, and conservative (Caryl, 2013; Jacobs, Filipov, & Wen, 2013). He became fascinated by conspiracy theories that claimed 9/11 was an "inside job"—a belief fed by jihadist websites as well as American sources, such as Alex Jones's Infowars and the film *Zeitgeist* (Cullison, 2013; Goldman, Tucker, & Apuzzo, 2013). Tamerlan felt doubly alienated: As the eldest son of a Chechen family, his failures were thought to weigh heavily on him (Caryl, 2013) and "his resident green card reminded him ... [that he was] not really an American" (Reitman, 2013, p. 55). Tamerlan's liminal status is most vividly illustrated by a 2012 trip to Dagestan, during which his repeated efforts to befriend Islamic radicals failed. The radicals deemed him "too American" (Cullison, 2013, para. 27).

As a psychological construct, the Double has often been associated with conditions such as schizophrenia (Herdman, 1991)—Dostoyevsky's tale is often interpreted in this way. Tamerlan once told his mother that he felt there were "two people living in him" (Reitman, 2013, p. 53). Other reports claimed that the "internal rambling that only he could hear" steadily grew more insistent and "had begun to issue orders" (Jacobs et al., 2013, para. 3). The stresses of his day-to-day life, familial expectations, and social stratification—and possibly concussions suffered while boxing—only gave strength to the "other person" within him. Like so many (fictional) others who have grappled with their double, Tamerlan's struggle ended in his demise.

The younger brother, Dzhokhar, was thought to be well adjusted and popular. He was described as an attractive, happy, charismatic pothead with a barbed wit (Jacobs et al., 2013; Reitman, 2013; Wines & Lovett, 2013). Tamerlan loudly espoused his conservative views—and in an accent no less. In sharp contrast, Dzhokhar, who spoke with no accent, rarely discussed religion with his friends, some of who only became aware of his religion after the bombing. Many drew the conclusion that Dzhokhar's "brother must have brainwashed him" (a friend quoted in Reitman, 2013, p. 57).

Investigative accounts of the brothers, however, put Tamerlan's influence on Dzhokhar in doubt: "Up to his arrest, he drank and smoked marijuana — more marijuana than most high school or college students, friends said — despite ... Tamerlan's clear disapproval" (Wines & Lovett, 2013, para. 28). Thought to be equally torn, Dzhokhar's identity crisis was reported to be precipitated by failing grades, a shrinking group of friends and a home life in turmoil (his parents divorced in 2011 and both eventually moved to Russia). Moreover, he began to have "terrifying nightmares about murder and destruction" (Wines & Lovett, 2013, para. 7). Dzhokhar came to be depicted as a deflector, a "master of concealment" (Wines & Lovett, 2013, para. 5) hiding a secret side that ultimately revealed a "deeply fractured" teenager (Reitman, 2013, p. 52).

At the core of the representational practices surrounding the bombing was the question of how to tell apart a good-looking popular kid who had been excited about gaining American citizenship and the one who scribbled "Fuck America" in his own blood as he lay dying during his run from police? Which is the original and which is the copy? The Double makes any answer to this question difficult if not untenable. Etymologically tied to doubt and duplicity, the power of the Double lies in its ambiguity and ambivalent amalgamation of us and Other (Herdman, 1991; Webber, 1996). The brothers presented precisely the same "phenomenological problem posed by Hyde [in] that [their] deformity is unnamable. The monster cannot be expressly distinguished from normal forms" (Webber, 1996, p. 7). Tamerlan "seemed so nice" (Remnick, 2013, para. 7). This refrain is often heard in cases of homegrown terrorism. For example, in reaction to hearing about the terrorism-related charges laid against Patrick Boyd, a Caucasian former high school football star in North Carolina, a neighbor exclaimed, "If he's a terrorist, he's the nicest terrorist I've ever met" (quoted in Locke, Shimron, & Shaffer, 2009, para. 9). Dzhokhar's former wrestling coach expressed similar confusion, "I knew this kid, and he was a good kid.... And, apparently, he's also a monster" (quoted in Reitman, 2013, p. 48). The disorientation, confusion, and terror surrounding the bombing and the brothers was perhaps best captured in the reactions to the August 2013 cover of *Rolling Stone*, which featured Dzhokhar's image.

Immediately after the cover's unveiling, politicians, celebrities, and others (through social media) denounced *Rolling Stone* for being insensitive and disrespectful to victims. Many saw the placement of Dzhokhar's image in a space usually reserved for American icons as the glorification of a killer, essentially transforming Tsarnaev into a rock star. Those who defended the cover stressed that the image represented the complicated nature of contemporary terrorism: "you can't see [the 'modern terrorist'] coming. He's not walking down the street with a scary beard and a red X through his face. He looks just like any other kid" (Taibbi, 2013, para. 29). The scary beard and red X is a reference to the image of Osama bin Laden featured on the cover of *Time* magazine after his death in 2011. For one journalist, the lesson "is that there are no warning signs for terrorism, that even nice, polite, sweet-looking young kids can end up packing pressure-cookers full of shrapnel and tossing them into

crowds of strangers” (Taibbi, 2013, para. 18). The narrative conveyed here repeatedly appears in the Double motif:

If the two of them had been placed next to each other, no one, absolutely no one, would have been able to say who was the real Mr. Golyadkin and who the imitation, who the old and who the new, who the original and who the copy. (Dostoyevsky’s *The Double*, quoted in Rank, 1971, p. 30)

At the core of both the criticism and defense of the *Rolling Stone* cover is the very anxiety faced when one encounters both Golyadkins, or Jekyll and Hyde, side by side: The threat America faces is not, or cannot be, visibly marked as Other. As headlines concerning other incidents of homegrown terror repeatedly articulate, a terrorist may be living, unassumingly, “next door” (e.g., Elliott, 2010; Faiola & Russakoff, 2007). The terrifying implication is that “[i]n the end, this is not a story about Chechnya or radical Islam or the insurgency in the North Caucasus” but about something fundamentally American (Ioffe, 2013, para. 10).

The representational strategies—internal splitting, identity crises, the inability to clearly distinguish adversary from friend—utilized in cases of homegrown terrorism are best accounted for by the Double, a figure that blends into the crowd. Despite some claims to the contrary (e.g., Taibbi, 2013), the media’s representational practices fall perfectly in line with official discourses concerning homegrown terrorism. An If You See Something, Say Something public service announcement posits, “terrorists and criminals work to blend in” (DHS, 2012). Another illustrates the homegrown threat through a miscellany of characters—including Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber), Timothy McVeigh, “Jihad Jane,” and others—and states that citizens ought to base their suspicions on the activities of an individual rather than “on a person’s race, religion or gender” (DHS, n.d.), an idea emphasized by the fact that PSAs often feature White terrorists (e.g., DHS, 2013). Theories of radicalization, many of which are funded by government or law-enforcement agencies, also posit the impossibility of a phenotypic or sociological profile of the homegrown terrorist and place their focus on a plethora of possible “triggers” (Sageman, 2008; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Wilner & Dubouloz, 2009). In discussing the Boston bombing, one counterterrorism “expert” captures the essence of these theories: “[T]here is no single precipitating event or stressor . . . [But] a whole constellation of things that aren’t working right.” (Tom Neer, quoted in Reitman, 2013, p. 57)

The convergence of mediated and official discourses concerning homegrown threat raises two interconnected points. First, in formulating what constitutes a danger to the collective, identity is not invoked in the form of a visible binaristic Other, but in more ambivalent ways. Second, the Double must be understood as “a symptom rather than aberration of particular cultural [social and political] conditions” (Clemens, 1999, p. 108). The latter point can only be unpacked through an examination of the cultural–political function of the Double, particularly within contemporary relations of enmity and power. Doing so connects the representational practices found in mediated and official discourses to an entire



set of conditions at the heart of the present-day relationship between identity and conflict.

### Disrupting the collective in and for war: The function of the Double

One writer defended *Rolling Stone* by claiming that the magazine's use of Dzhokhar's image was "not intended to glamorize Tsarnaev. Just the opposite, I believe [it was] supposed to frighten. It's Tsarnaev's very normalcy and niceness that is the most monstrous and terrifying thing about him" (Taibbi, 2013, para. 21). In almost every literary instance in which a character spots his double, the experience is one of sheer terror. Perhaps, the magazine had a similar intention: to facilitate the terrifying shock of seeing something of one's self in a monster. Images of the Other, such as one of a menacing bin Laden, also frighten us. The Other and the Double are at times conflated, which is perhaps understandable given that, as psychological constructs, they are both conceptualized as externalized projections of an incongruity always—already internal to the individual. The function of both the Other and the Double, however, is not limited to inducing fear. By turning the focus onto the *form* of the images associated with each figure—one visually ambiguous, the other more neatly defined in a binary—the radical difference of their function vis-à-vis conflict emerges.

An Other is formulated through the deployment of binary oppositions—good/evil, rational/irrational, modern/backward, so forth. The Other embodies the negative halves of these binaries, acting as a nodal point that holds the identity of a collective in place by masking (and externalizing) the divisions, gaps, and tensions within any given identity position (Žižek, 1989). In times of conflict, the Other qua threat unifies a collective, facilitating among its members a willingness to kill their adversary and risk their lives doing so.

Rather than unifying a collective through the establishment of dichotomies, the Double blurs the binary of us and Other, marking the group as unsound or unsettled (Dryden, 2003; Plank, 1980). The Double marks the abandonment (if only temporarily) of the form of "originary [external] difference intrinsic to the Western logos" (Chow, 2006, p. 48). As is clear in the contrast between the images of Tsarnaev and bin Laden, the Double, unlike the Other, does not reify dichotomous positions by clearly externalizing threat. Here, the ambivalent nature of Bhabha's (1994) stereotype is redirected onto one's own community. Thus, with the Double, "what captures and entraps—what seems inescapable—is none other than an ever changing tendency to shift and defer, ad infinitum" (Chow, 2006, p. 59).

The deferring function of the Double is often linked to the disruption of power relations (Plank, 1980). Blurring the boundary between us and Other is thought to prevent authoritative assertions of identity and, thus, confound state apparatuses of power; however, by situating the Double (its function, form and discourse) in contemporary relations of (absolute) enmity and (bio)power, an inverse effect comes to light. Rather than being disruptive, we see that the Double is a fundamental component of the exercise of power in the context of homegrown terrorism.

**Absolute hostility: New media, identity, and the structure of conflict**

Carl Schmitt's *Theory of the Partisan* presents a historical typology of enmity: conventional, real, and absolute. In the movement from one form of enmity to another, particular binaries central to waging war are blurred. Conventional enmity—illustrated by interstate war in Europe from Westphalia to WWI—was one of clear binaries: us/Other, citizen/soldier, war/peace, criminal/enemy. Conventional enmity was also limited spatially and temporally, waged on a delineated battlefield and lasting until the defeat of an enemy. Supporting these limits was the idea that conflict was waged by equal Others—*justis hostis*, a concept devoid of moralistic undertones. Here, the enemy was evil because she was one's enemy; she was not one's enemy because she was evil. Some binaries (e.g., criminal/enemy) were blurred in real enmity—civil wars and wars of decolonization—but conflict remained bound in space and time (i.e., until the liberation of a particular territory).

The boundaries and limits of conventional enmity were completely undone in absolute enmity, which is the realm of the global partisan, a figure defined by her ideological position. Here, morality and enmity fuse and one is an adversary because she is evil, a narrative that permeates both American media and the media of terrorist organizations. Thus, the conflict characteristic of absolute enmity ends not in defeat, but only in annihilation, effectively eliminating any spatial or temporal limits of hostility. Indeed, the global war on terror, lacking any such limits, engulfs the globe and is seemingly endless. The unraveling of the boundaries of conventional enmity is most evident in the phenomenon of the homegrown terrorist, in which territory, ideology, and phenotypic categories do not coincide.

For Schmitt (2007), several phenomena account for the shift in the nature of enmity: the global ideologies that dominated the post-WWII world (i.e., Capitalism and Communism), the expansion of the international community, the just war doctrine (which tied morality to enmity), and scientific advances in weapons technology. Schmitt also asserts that advances in “methods of communication” allowed for the success of the “real” partisan (i.e., guerilla warrior; p. 13). Similarly, new media are central in discourses accounting for the rise of the global partisan as illustrated in discussions of “internet radicalization.” The ubiquity of the Double in 19th century literature was also closely linked to anxieties concerning new technologies and the novel forms of contact they facilitated with distant others (Coates, 1988; Dryden, 2003). In short, the Double emerged in response to the development of a “world of perpetual light” (Coates, 1988, p. 3).

In the contemporary moment, the Double reemerges in response to a networked world of perpetual light promised by digital communication technologies. Just as the lit streets of London allowed Hyde to roam about and live out his most vile desires, digital and social media were thought to foster the secret, second or shadow lives of the Tsarnaevs. One official commented, “I would not be surprised if they [the Tsarnaevs] had another life over social media” (quoted in Remnick, 2013, para. 10). For Coates (1988), “the Double can be said to crystallize ... when the self is projected into a space hitherto defined as other” (p. 32). Digital media was framed as

providing the mechanism by which to project one's self into "Other" spaces. Tamerlan followed an obscure Russian jihadist, Gadzhimurad Dolgatov, online (Dewey, 2013) and Dzhokhar "abandoned his American Facebook for the Russian version V Kontakte" (Reitman, 2013, p. 55). The brothers' contact with Russia was so troubling that a Congressional delegation was sent there in an attempt to better understand what had occurred in Boston. Most importantly, both brothers downloaded jihadist propaganda, particularly, the sermons of Anwar al-Awlaki (who was linked to a dozen incidents both before and after his death in 2011), as well as the bomb-making instructions found in al-Qaeda's English-language e-magazine, *Inspire*, with which al-Awlaki was involved (Klaidman, 2013).

In these accounts, new media is intimately tied to the blurred distinction between citizen and soldier and the undoing of the spatial limits of conflict. Territory, ideology, and phenotypic markers do not coincide, fostering "wider spaces of insecurity, fear and general mistrust" (Schmitt, 2007, p. 73). In the resulting "landscape of treason" (Boveri, 1961, cited in Schmitt, 2007), America becomes part of the battlefield (National Defense Authorization Act; NDAA, 2012, section 1031) and conflict can materialize in Boston, New York, Raleigh, and Portland. The blurring of the spatial boundaries of war suggests that, in the context of homegrown terrorism, identity does not service the waging of conflict through binaries that locate threat in a clearly defined Other. Rather, closure is deferred—much like the temporal end of the global war on terror—and threat is formulated as lurking within the American populace and landscape, with the potential to materialize in people and spaces one might least expect.

Absolute hostility certainly describes the conditions, technological and otherwise, from which the Double may arise. The Double, however, is neither simply an objective threat nor one that apparatuses of governmental power seek to reinscribe into neat binaries. Well before 9/11, experts highlighted the changing nature of war and the need for new strategies to combat the emergence of networked threats (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1996). The global partisan is one such networked threat. The deferment of the Double, signaling to a collective that it is unsettled or ruptured, allows for a broader range of individuals to be marked as threatening. In other words, the Double opens up entirely new spaces and modalities of policing and managing conflicts that are not limited, but networked and circulating. In short, the Double does not simply mark confusion about identity, but rather, is inscribed in the very logic of biopolitical power.

### **Policing terror: Biopower and the Double**

In Schmitt's historical typology, what stands out is that each successive form of hostility relies less and less on binary logics. There is a similar shift—even if not perfectly commensurable—to be found in Foucault's (2003, 2007) analysis of discipline and biopower. Discipline involves binaries at its core, marking a clear boundary between what is normal/permitted and what is abnormal/prohibited. What Deleuze (1992) calls "molds" are implemented in a variety of analogous spaces, such as the prison,

the clinic, and the asylum, through strategies of enclosure or confinement that allow “nothing to escape” (Foucault, 2007, p. 45). In an environment characterized by discipline, threat is formulated as Other.

Biopower, on the other hand, is a modality of power concerned more with population as “a datum that depends on a series of variables” and is managed through probabilities, rates, and ratios (Foucault, 2007, p. 71). Biopolitical modalities of power focus on distributions of normality, problems of circulation, and the tracking of “constants and regularities even in accidents” (p. 74). In other words, what Deleuze (1992) came to call “control society” involves “inseparable variations, forming a system of variable geometry” rather than molds and binaries (p. 4). Thus, pathologies are not confined, but are part of the calculus of power. The plotting of probabilities is precisely the logic inscribed in the formulation of risk, which is concerned with anticipation and prevention (Rabinow & Rose, 2003). Security, in Foucault’s (2007) terminology, similarly “works on the future,” focuses on the uncertain, and “tries to prevent [violence, crime, terror, etc.] in advance” (pp. 20 and 37).

Homegrown terrorism is a phenomenon through which these modalities are made visible. The object and objective of biopolitics is life (Foucault, 2003) and homegrown terrorism is a threat to life in two senses. The first is literal—people die. The Boston bombing killed three and 16 lost limbs (granted, deaths as a result of homegrown terrorism are a rare occurrence in the US; see Greenwald, 2015). The second is broader, signaling a risk to the health and unity of a collective. Terrorism is often said to threaten “our way of life,” and homegrown terrorism threatens a collective’s sense of shared belonging because threats like the Tsarnaevs emerge from within the community, “*He looks just like any other kid.*” Efforts to anticipate and prevent similar threats from materializing do not always simply place suspicion on a particular group (via binaries or molds), but work through the monitoring of a set of elements and their distribution—operations informed by an “ever changing tendency to shift and defer” (Chow, 2006, p. 59). In these efforts the categories of us and Other are redeployed as distributed potentials.

Consider theories of radicalization like those applied to the Tsarnaev case. While the theories of radicalization developed by Sageman (2008), Silber and Bhatt (2007) and Wilner and Dubouloz (2009) differ, they all present a process—one that is overly linear and precludes any reversal away from radicalization—in which an individual goes from being “unremarkable” to constituting a mobilized threat. The aim of these theories is not to identify a clearly delineated enemy, but to outline a broad array of parameters and examine the confluence of factors that are more or less likely to push an individual beyond an acceptable curve of normality and toward violence. In these theories, innumerable experiences can act as triggers: personal (e.g., Tamerlan’s failed boxing career and Dzhokhar’s troubled home life), economic (e.g., Tamerlan’s chronic unemployment and the family’s inability to provide a comfortable life), social (e.g., alienation and the difficulties that come with assimilation), and political (e.g., prejudice against Muslims and the war on terror). Even medical histories—Tamerlan’s

sustained concussions from boxing were linked to his mental health — are considered factors in the radicalization process.

Theories of radicalization do not simply limit their purview to one's experiences and cognitive phenomena (i.e., how and about what one thinks). In varying degrees, theorists of radicalization readily acknowledge the affective dimensions of belonging (i.e., how one feels) in the formulation of potential triggers (e.g., the brothers *felt* alienated). The extent and character of many theories of radicalization is, thus, not marked by the categorization of identities into threatening and nonthreatening (although some singularly focus on jihadist terrorism and overemphasize theological dimensions). Rather, they focus on factors that weave through every aspect of life, deferring the closure of identity and requiring its fluidity to anticipate and prevent threats.

Theories of radicalization are also deeply tied to the distinction between disciplinary power, which lets nothing escape, and biopolitics or security, which “lets things happen” (Foucault, 2007, p. 45). The strategies of preventative policing utilized in cases of homegrown terrorism require that, to a certain extent, individuals be free to radicalize. While digital media is often depicted, as in the Tsarnaev case, as facilitating radicalization and fostering identity crises, websites and chat forums in which radicalization is thought to occur are not simply prohibited or shut down. Rather, they are used to monitor, surveil, and manage terroristic potentials. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Saudi government, for example, went so far as to set up a website to act as a forum for jihadists (Musawi, 2010). Beyond “letting things happen,” such a strategy “makes things happen.” This logic is taken even further in the use of paid government informants who befriend individuals, encourage, facilitate, or procure their radicalization (via downloading jihadist material), help plan “attacks,” and obtain (fake) weapons (see *US v Cromitie et al.*, 2010). Policing and surveillance practices aimed at anticipating threat are, thus, not dependent on a threat constructed as an Other, but a shifting formulation that facilitates the incrimination of a broader segment of the populace, a function fulfilled by the Double.

### Rethinking the American war on terror

Acts of war are tied to identity. The theory of the Double presented here accounts for the representational practices of threat in the context of homegrown terrorism without reducing the accompanying complexities, contradictions, and incongruities to simply a confusion of identity. Rather, the theory highlights that the ambivalence at the core of media representations of homegrown terrorism is a fundamental component of contemporary forms of absolute enmity and modalities of biopower. George W. Bush famously stated, “You are either with us or against us . . .” In his statement, there is no “them,” no clearly delineated Other. Instead, Bush's words convey an ever-shifting landscape populated by a mutating and networked threat that must be regulated, managed, and anticipated — a project that began decades prior to 9/11 and that requires an open and deferred sense of collective identity. In the effort

to suspend any spatial or temporal end of the war on terror, the complementary and crucial unsettling of a collective's sense of shared identity is fulfilled by the Double. In short, the Double illustrates that, in a context in which territory, ideology, and phenotypic markers do not coincide or form neat dichotomies, collective identity, and notions of difference are put into the service of conflict not through an us/Other binary, but rather, through an ambivalent, ever-shifting threatening-foe that can materialize anywhere and in any body.

The Double's fundamental logic of shifting and deferment highlights that the citizen is no longer guaranteed the position of "us" based on binary markers. When the ambivalent amalgam of the Double transforms the categories of us and Other into distributed potentials, all that is left is proof of one's allegiance (Tiqqun, 2010). What is the If You See Something Say Something campaign if not a demand for citizens to prove themselves? Tamerlan's wife, Katherine, was suspected of involvement in the bombing because she failed to spot danger and alert authorities; she failed to prove her allegiance by seeing something and saying something (Smith & Murphy, 2013).

The distributed potentials of threat, however, are not equally dispersed among the populace. Categorical and binaristic forms of otherness persist, marking some as (potentially) more threatening than others. To what extent was the suspicion surrounding Katherine Tsarnaev based on her conversion to Islam and donning of the hijab? Or based on heteronormative ideas of what a "good wife" ought to know about her husband? In sharp contrast to the *Rolling Stone* cover, one conservative publication went so far as to give the Tsarnaev brothers darker complexions on its cover in order to mark their otherness. Indeed, the war on terror does not lack images of stereotyped Others, a phenomenon neither ignored nor precluded by the theory of the Double developed here. The move from the Other to the Double is, much like the shifts that Schmitt and Foucault illustrate, only a shift "in emphasis" (Foucault, 2007, p. 363). Forms of enmity overlap and biopolitical modalities embed themselves within the strategies of disciplinary power. Similarly, the figures of the Double and the Other are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they embody forms of conflict and relations of power that overlap and coexist, creating a productive tension between suture and rupture, closure, and deferment. The theory of the Double developed here is intended to highlight a more ambivalent modality of inscribing threat *within* a population that operates alongside and overlaps with — and yet radically differs in form, function, and discourse than — more binaristic forms of Othering. A particular inflection of otherness is central to the Double and the play of identity figured by the Double certainly intersects with various notions of difference. The intricacy of the overlapping relation between the Other and the Double is illustrated by the fact that the complex operation of identity embodied in the Double manifests itself even in jihadist cases, that is, those incidents of homegrown terror most often associated with an Other.

The theory of the Double suggests that war on terror must be temporally and spatially understood beyond 9/11—its origins preceding 9/11 and its environs wider than those suggested by an Other embodied in the terrifying face of Osama bin Laden. The implication of various groups as threatening under the rubric of terrorism

(e.g., ecoterrorists) reinforces the need to critically examine a more fluid and shifting politics of identity that leaves open potentials of mutation and transformation in the service of anticipatory policing and management—precisely the logic that underwrites widespread surveillance programs such as the NSA’s PRISM. The theory of the Double provides an avenue through which to examine the interconnections of communication, media, identity (representation and difference), conflict, and power in a broader milieu, which would, in turn, further refine the theory pursued here. Does the Double manifest differently in media representations of jihadist and right- or left-wing extremist cases of homegrown terror? Do the practices embodied in the Double signal any broader trends in media representation beyond homegrown terrorism? What are the linkages between the ambivalent representations of identity in and for conflict described here and postracial discourse in the United States? How are mass incarceration, race, and counterterrorism interconnected in fears concerning “Prislam”? What are the representational practices at the core of the communicatory politics of groups like the Islamic State? These are all issues closely tied to practices of representation embodied in the figure of the Double (as well as its relation to the Other). Deferring and shifting closure, the Double provides a malleable formulation of threat that can shift suspicions and allegiances in unforeseen and rhizomatic ways, infinitely pushing back the horizon at which we might imagine an end to the war on terror.

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